Medical uncertainty and clinician-athlete relations: the management of concussion injuries in rugby union by Dominic Malcolm (1256364)
 
 
 
This item was submitted to Loughborough’s Institutional Repository 
(https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/) by the author and is made available under the 
following Creative Commons Licence conditions. 
 
 
 
 
 
For the full text of this licence, please go to: 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/2.5/ 
 
 1 
Medical Uncertainty and Clinician-Athlete Relations: The Management of 
Concussion Injuries in Rugby Union 
 
This paper addresses clinical practice in sport medicine. Combining notions of 
medical uncertainty with a figurational sociological emphasis on interdependence, the 
paper illustrates how uncertainty characterizes the medical understanding, clinical 
treatment, and patient experience of concussion. Faced with uncertainty, the 
clinician’s desire for recognition and validation through athletes’ dependence on them 
enables medically-based diagnostic and treatment guidelines to be replaced by the 
understanding and definition of concussion dominant in the sport subculture. 
Clinicians further invoke strategies that protect their professional status and therefore 
secure their interdependence with others in the sport club figuration. The paper 
advances our understanding by illuminating the basis on which clinicians and athletes 
negotiate treatment and the impact of these experiences on clinicians’ actions and 
beliefs.  
 2 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the emerging literature on clinical 
practice in sport medicine.  Much of this work has concentrated on the “peculiarity” 
of sport as a context in which to practice (Walk, 1997). It focuses on the way that 
sport clinicians (a term used to encompass doctors, physiotherapists and student 
athletic trainers) are required to balance normal medical ethical considerations with 
the demands of employers and/or coaches (Waddington, 2000; Waddington & 
Roderick, 2002), considerations of “precaution” and “risk” (Safai, 2003, 2004), and 
health relative to performance (Theberge, 2006). Malcolm (2006a) further illustrates 
why sport physicians often wield relatively limited power over their athlete-patients 
and physiotherapist colleagues, and Theberge (2008, p. 19) examines the “ongoing 
tensions” between different groups of health care providers within a “system of health 
professions.”  
Walk (1997) and Safai (2004) indicate that coaches in North American college 
sport sometimes dispute or negotiate medical recommendations. Theberge’s (2006, 
2008) research with clinicians working with Canadian Olympic athletes reveals a 
more harmonious but still discursive approach.  Waddington’s (2000, pp. 71-79) work 
in relation to English League football suggests that challenges to clinical autonomy 
might be most prevalent in professional sport. The differences between the North 
American and UK literature do, however, indicate that the specifics of the “everyday 
work setting” significantly influence the treatment athletes receive (Malcolm, 2006a). 
The negotiation of health care in sport might be universal, but the relative power of 
negotiating parties varies according to the dynamics of the particular figuration (Elias, 
1978).  
The literature on clinical practice in sport medicine has grown out of the 
sociological work on pain and injury in sport (see Young, 2004 and Roderick, 2006a 
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for overviews). Young classifies this literature in terms of Pain Cultures (the causes 
and contexts of injury), Pain Zones (athletes’ reflections on injury rates and the 
experience of injury), and Pain Parameters (media, legal, and policy responses to 
injury). Summarizing the literature Young invokes ideas such as the “normalization” 
and “rationalization” of risk, pain and injury (Curry, 1993) as part of the “sport ethic” 
(Hughes & Coakley, 1991), or “culture of risk” (Nixon, 1992). Gendered identities are 
also highlighted as significant in the social construction of injury (Messner, 1992; 
Young & White, 2000), but regardless of gender, athletes tolerate injury “in order to 
maintain their athletic self” (Pike & Maguire, 2003, p. 245). Young concludes that, 
“At the professional level at least, injury may thus be understood as the outcome of 
intricate relationships” (p. 6, emphasis added). Athletes talk about their bodies and 
understand injury in subculture-specific ways as a consequence of the networks of 
relationships that characterize the sport context. 
This paper examines how networks of relations also influence the social 
construction of sport clinicians’ knowledge. I argue that the social relations in which 
doctors are enmeshed influence not just what treatment they provide, but also the 
ways that they come to think about, understand, and define clinical conditions.  The 
analysis combines the concept of uncertainty with a figurational sociological 
emphasis on interdependence. The paper contributes to our understanding of clinical 
practice in sport by highlighting the strategies practitioners use when uncertainty 
threatens their professional status and thus their patients’ reliance on their expertise. 
 
Theoretical Perspective: Medical Uncertainty and Figurational Sociology 
Renee Fox (2000, p. 409), a leading sociologist of medicine, argues that 
“uncertainty is inherent in medicine.” Uncertainty has, moreover, become “a major 
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motif in the medical sociological literature” because of the various ways in which it is 
manifest in medical practice.  
Uncertainty is a common characteristic of being a patient and is therefore 
central to “illness experience” research (Conrad, 1987).  Conrad suggests that patients 
may experience five forms of uncertainty. Patients experience uncertainty because: a) 
something unusual is happening to their bodies; and b) by definition, they have a 
problem that they themselves cannot resolve. Patients who believe that medical staff 
also harbor uncertainties about their condition will themselves become increasingly 
uncertain.  Conrad places his final three categories under the umbrella term existential 
uncertainty.  Existential uncertainty refers to “the individual’s awareness that his or 
her future is open and undetermined” (Adamson, 1997, p. 134).  This umbrella 
category can include trajectory uncertainty (where recovery is unpredictable), 
symptomatic uncertainty (where different symptoms occur at different times and in 
response to different stimuli) and, most centrally, uncertainty over how illness may 
effect one’s life more broadly. The injured athlete might, for instance, worry about the 
possible end of a playing career and question self-identity (Roderick, 2004, 2006b).  
Uncertainty is also a normal feature of becoming and being a medical 
practitioner.  Fox (1957) argues that medical students experience three basic types of 
uncertainty: uncertainty stemming from the limitations of medical knowledge 
(epistemological uncertainty); uncertainty stemming from the awareness of being 
unable to master all aspects of medical knowledge and practice (clinical uncertainty); 
and uncertainty stemming from the inability to distinguish between the two. Aspirant 
medical practitioners therefore “train for uncertainty” through, for example, a process 
of intellectualization that entails the acquisition of greater knowledge and developing 
and applying methods for assessing probabilities to problems for which uncertainty 
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exists (Fox, 2000, p. 410). These techniques provide some amelioration but 
“uncertainty is still attached to many aspects of medical practice” (Cockerham, 2004, 
p. 217).1  
A doctor’s ability to manage their uncertainty is important for, as Adamson 
notes, “in many situations, expressions of uncertainty by medical professionals would 
violate norms and invite punitive sanctions” (1997, p. 135). Light (1979) argues that 
post-training physicians seek to increase control over clinical uncertainties through 
the assertion of individualized judgments made on the basis of personal experience, 
and by adopting particular treatment paradigms. Rafalovich (2005) identifies ways in 
which epistemological uncertainty can lead clinicians to be ambivalent towards 
diagnostic criteria. His study of the treatment of attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder (ADHD) found that practitioners become more flexible in their 
implementation of diagnostic and treatment protocols when faced with patient/parent 
resistance, which has itself been fuelled by broader public debate over the condition.  
Clinicians’ interpretations and applications of diagnostic labels may, consequently, 
“be a far cry from how texts provide the confines for a diagnosis” (p. 306). Yair 
(2007) argues that “under conditions of uncertainty, doctors chose to conform – 
namely, to chose what others have elected – so as to gain social validation” (p. 689). 
Use of a figurational sociological approach enables these largely micro-
sociological processes to be linked to broader, macro-sociological factors. Elias’s 
(1978) concept of “figuration” stems from a desire to overcome the traditional 
dichotomy between agency and structure. For Elias the “individual” and the “society” 
are two inseparable levels of the same human world and thus the key to understanding 
social phenomena is the examination of the “networks of interdependency” that 
humans form. In this analysis, therefore, I examine not just the face-to-face 
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interactions experienced by sport clinicians, but consider the impact of a broader 
network of relations that encompasses rugby administrators and the community of 
sport medicine researchers. Elias, moreover, views power as a structural property of 
all social relations, always a question of balance and always in flux. In this paper, 
therefore, I examine the process by which sport medicine personnel are enabled and 
constrained to act and react to others in order to safeguard their status and position 
within the “rugby club” figuration. The concept of medical uncertainty, moreover, 
resonates with Elias’s understanding of figurations as highly complex and thus of 
human understanding of the social world as consequently and necessarily incomplete. 
Figurational sociologists have traditionally identified the co-existence of intended and 
unintended consequences as the main manifestation of this (e.g. Murphy & Sheard, 
2008), but my focus here is on the way that the doubt generated in complex networks 
of social relations leads to “internal” self-regulation and behavioral adaptation.  
Following a discussion of research methods, I examine how epistemological, 
clinical, and existential uncertainty influence the behavior of injured players and sport 
clinicians. These three domains of medical uncertainty are presented separately in the 
first part of this paper, though in keeping with the figurational approach, they should 
be seen as highly interdependent. The paper subsequently draws on the literature on 
the management of medical uncertainty to illustrate how sport clinicians manage 
concussion injuries in rugby so as to minimize conflict with their athlete-patients. 
Clinicians adapt their practice to foster cooperation and thereby enable their 
interdependent relationships with coaches and players to continue.  
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Methods 
Data were collected as part of a broader project on the management of injuries 
in English elite male rugby union. “Elite” rugby union was defined as the 68 teams 
playing in the top four Leagues.2 I have explored the effects of commercialization on 
the treatment of sporting injury (Malcolm & Sheard, 2002), critiqued epidemiological 
work which falsely portrayed an “injury crisis” in rugby union (Malcolm, Sheard & 
Smith, 2004, 2005), examined the changing character of sports medicine provision in 
the game (Malcolm 2006b), and sought to explain why sport clinicians wield 
relatively little influence in professional sport (Malcolm 2006a). The research 
included both a questionnaire survey and semi-structured interviews, though it is the 
latter that centrally informs the analysis here.   
Between September 2000 and October 2001, a colleague and I interviewed nine 
doctors, ten physiotherapists, sixteen players, and seven coaches. The sample was 
assembled using largely convenience and snowball sampling methods and included 
representatives from fifteen of the 68 clubs. Some purposive sampling was used to 
ensure the sample included respondents from a geographically dispersed range of 
clubs and clubs with less complex organizational structures. Non-probability sampling 
methods were justified on the basis that no reliable sampling frame was available (de 
Vaus, 1996, p. 77), and because those who work in professional sport are notoriously 
“elusive” populations to access (May, 2001, p. 95). 
Interviews lasted between 30 and 80 minutes and took place in various 
locations including workplaces, homes and rugby clubs.  Interviews were recorded 
and transcribed in full. Interview schedules covering key areas for each category of 
interviewee were drawn up using the existing literature (especially the work of 
Roderick, Waddington & Parker, 2000), and the researchers’ existing knowledge of 
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the game. Doctors and physiotherapists, for instance, were asked about how they 
obtained their position at the club, their normal work routine, and how 
commercialization processes were influencing their clinical practice (see Malcolm & 
Sheard, 2002). They were further asked about their relations with players, coaches and 
other medical staff. The emphasis on interdependence, and the way that structural 
changes in the sport impacted upon aspects of agency, developed out of a 
commitment to a figurational sociological approach.  
Three topics of potential conflict in these relationships were identified: 
painkilling injections, confidentiality and concussion. It became apparent during the 
research process that clinicians saw dealing with concussion as the most problematic 
aspect of their practice. The flexibility of the semi-structured approach gave 
interviewees considerable scope to develop this topic. Data on concussion were 
abstracted from the interview transcripts and themes identified according to their 
frequency (Stroh, 2000, pp. 210-212). An additional colleague suggested that research 
on medical uncertainty might be helpful in developing the analysis of concussion 
management, and this led to a process of cross-referencing of empirical data with the 
literature from sport medicine and the sociology of medicine. 
In the next sections I outline how uncertainty permeates the medical 
understanding, clinical treatment, and patient experience of concussion. The debates 
about concussion in medical journals illustrate the limits of medical knowledge and 
therefore epistemological uncertainty. Regulations in rugby union, moreover, are 
explicitly justified on the basis that head injuries often entail considerable clinical 
uncertainty. I then use testimony from doctors and physiotherapists to show not only 
that many experience clinical uncertainty when dealing with concussion, but attempt 
to intellectualize and/or rationalize the condition and their treatment of it, before 
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describing how concussion entails specific forms of existential uncertainty for the 
injured player. The paper concludes by illustrating how clinicians, when faced with 
these co-existing forms of uncertainty, reject medical guidelines and pursue strategies 
that will minimize conflict and thus secure their position in the “rugby club” 
figuration. 
 
Epistemological Uncertainty and Concussion 
Concussion is typically caused by rapid acceleration, deceleration, or rotation of 
the head. It normally entails the sudden onset of symptoms at the point of impact, that 
are often short-lived and resolved spontaneously (McCrory, Johnston, Meeuwisse, 
Aubry, Cantu, Dvorak, Graf-Baumann, Kelly, Lovell & Schamasch, 2005, p. 196).  
There are three main symptoms of concussion – loss of consciousness, loss of 
memory, and confusion – with loss of consciousness traditionally seen as the primary 
measure of severity. The International Rugby Board (IRB) also identifies giddiness, 
unsteadiness, vomiting, disorientation, headache, and double or blurred vision as 
“signs and symptoms of concussion.” Regulation 10.1.1 concludes that, “being 
unaware of what happened, even for a few moments at the time of the injury is the 
most consistent sign that the player is or has been concussed” (IRB, 2008).   
The IRB has adopted a definition of concussion that does not differentiate 
between grades of severity. Any player sustaining any concussion must abstain from 
playing and training “for a minimum period of three weeks,” and should only resume 
“when symptom free and declared fit after a proper medical examination.” This period 
may only be foreshortened following examination by a recognized neurological 
expert.3 The rationale for this relatively strict policy is identified in the (English) 
Rugby Football Union’s (RFU) Handbook of Safe Rugby (RFU, 1998) which states 
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that the IRB ruling is based on “the need to have a simple and universally accepted 
instruction across the whole spectrum of world rugby, which is applicable by those 
without medical training” (p. 51).  
Concussion is the only injury that the IRB (2008) seeks to define and, with 
blood injuries, the only injury subject to specific regulation. Concussion, moreover, is 
one of the IRB’s seven “first priority” areas for medical research funding. These 
policy stances are indicative of the concern over the harm that can potentially be 
caused by such injuries.  The “real danger” of concussion, the RFU (1998) state, is 
often obscured and seemingly mild concussions “may rapidly progress to become life 
threatening” (p. 47).  Paul McCrory (2001a), a leading sport neurologist, notes that the 
heightened concern over concussion stems from the notion that repeated incidents 
predispose athletes to “second impact syndrome;” where subsequent head injuries 
become increasingly regular and/or severe (p. 381).  McCrory also refers to the 
existence of an “unstated fear” that athletes who are repeatedly concussed will 
ultimately experience similar cognitive decline to that of the “punch drunk” boxer (p. 
380).  Whilst the IRB has particularly strict policies, debates about concussion in 
other sports indicate a more general perception of the severity of this kind of injury 
(see, for example, Schwarz, 2007). 
The sport medicine community has begun to voice significant epistemological 
uncertainty regarding sport-related concussion in recent years.  This gap in knowledge 
stems from the absence of data relating to contact sports for, “there is no existing 
animal or other experimental model that accurately reflects a sporting concussive 
injury” (McCrory et al., 2005, p. 197).  Existing studies commonly draw upon the 
literature on head injuries sustained in boxing and motor vehicle accidents.  These 
comparisons are, however, misleading because: a) the frequency of repetitive head 
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trauma in boxing is thought to pose “unique risks;” and b) collisions in sports such as 
rugby union involve much lower acceleration-deceleration forces than do motor 
vehicle accidents. There has been some debate over whether to grade concussion 
injuries according to duration of symptoms rather than on the presence/absence of 
particular symptoms (McCrory et al., 2005).  There is, moreover, no scientific 
evidence that sustaining several concussions over a sporting career will necessarily 
result in permanent damage (McCrory, 2001a).  McCrory (1999) argues that the 
proliferation of scales designed to assess the severity of head injuries means that 
clinicians and athletes are often confused by conflicting advice and thus illustrates 
how epistemological and clinical uncertainty interact. 
McCrory (2001b) criticizes existing research on concussion for being 
“anecdotal … bizarre rather than reflecting established medical principles” (p. 82). He 
concludes that the field is plagued by “neuromythology” derived from folk wisdom, 
methodologically flawed medical research, and media stories of athletes’ experiences 
of head trauma. Even the 2004 Prague Agreement Statement on Concussion in Sport, 
authored by ten of the world’s leading experts, concedes that “the science of 
concussion is at an early stage” (McCrory et al., 2005, p. 202). This acknowledgement 
has also had the unintended consequence of conveying epistemological uncertainty to 
the practice domain. It is to an illustration of clinicians’ uncertainty over concussion 
that I now turn. 
 
Clinical Uncertainty and Concussion 
Research in the sociology of medicine indicates that doctors are often reluctant 
to express uncertainty for fear of undermining their expert authority (Calnan, 1984; 
Adamson, 1997; Rafalovich, 2005). Physiotherapists, given their respective 
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professional status, might be more inclined to disclose their concerns. However the 
majority of sport medicine personnel interviewed, regardless of their profession, 
expressed elements of uncertainty about their own knowledge of concussion. Their 
strategies for overcoming uncertainty not only illustrate what a problem this is for 
practitioners, but also their interdependence within a broader network of relations of 
sport administrators and the sport medicine community.  
Clinicians normally responded to questions about concussion by describing the 
condition as “Very, very, difficult” (physiotherapist), “a very dodgy area” (doctor), or 
a “huge grey area” (doctor). One doctor indicated that concussion had been discussed 
with fellow clinicians: “What’s concussion is an issue that’s come up.” The doctor 
went on to note that, “I know it’s not pain,” but did not provide a more definitive 
answer. A physiotherapist not only noted the problems they had with the diagnosis of 
concussion but argued that, “In fact the doctors are confused too.” 
Interviewees sometimes rationalized their own uncertainty by responding to 
questions about concussion with questions of their own. One doctor, who argued that 
loss of consciousness provided a relatively reliably diagnostic guide, continued, “But 
when a guy is banged on the head and is a bit dizzy and feels sick for a few hours, is 
that concussion?” Another doctor, reflecting on a particular incident, said, “I suppose 
on a very low scale you could diagnose, there was probably a bit of concussion, but 
what is concussion?” The degree of uncertainty was most clearly demonstrated by a 
physiotherapist who was asked to clarify their continued use of the term “head 
injury.” The physiotherapist replied, “we’ve had some players who have not 
necessarily, obviously, had a concussion, but have had some form of concussion 
symptoms, so I use … (long pause) well they don’t have concussion but they have 
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symptoms of a head injury.” Following a further pause, the physiotherapist asked, 
“Should I be defining that as concussion?”  
Clinicians sought to legitimize their uncertainty by referring to the conditions 
under which they were required to practice. One doctor argued that, “the clinical fact 
is all laid out – how you go about diagnosis – the only problem is the player’s taken a 
(mild) knock and in the heat of the situation it’s really quite pressured.” Another 
stated that the “problem is that you have to make a snap decision,” and further called 
for regulations to provide more time to assess head injuries. A third doctor argued 
that, “it is virtually impossible to check the extent of a head injury in a dehydrated 
player.” A fourth identified the cognitive testing done in Australian Rules Football as 
a potential advance and explicitly argued that the central benefit of this would be to 
alleviate uncertainty: “then you can be certain that they returned to pre-injury brain 
function.” 
Club doctors, like the junior doctors studied by Fox (1957), typically attempted 
to overcome clinical uncertainty through a process of investigation and 
intellectualization. One doctor argued that, “I looked into this when we had a guy with 
a bang on the head … There is no definition that is widely accepted; there are a 
variety of definitions all of which are slightly different.”  Other doctors had sought 
direction from the national governing body, the RFU, but remained dissatisfied: “we 
did get them on the phone but when I’d finished talking to them I thought now was 
that very helpful at all or what?” Another stated that, 
I spoke to the RFU doctor on this and he agreed with me that it’s all a bit up in 
the air.  Nobody seems to be interested in changing it or making it more 
scientific.  We spent a lot of time saying it isn’t scientific and how there isn’t a 
definition but nobody seems to be trying to get anything more sensitive.  
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The attempts of doctors to alleviate their clinical uncertainty were, however, 
undermined by the epistemological uncertainty evident in the broader sport medicine 
community. One doctor noted that, “The number of conferences about concussion you 
wouldn’t believe,” and went on to argue that “there are suggestions that there’s no 
common factor that helps you say that was most definitely concussed, or certainly not 
concussed.”  Another pointed to the irrelevance of existing severity scales to sport: 
‘All the scores … are designed for serious head injuries, not just a bit of mild 
concussion and usually the relevance to somebody feeling a bit dizzy after a game is 
zero.” The doctor concluded that, “we have no way of assessing the severity (of a 
head injury) in that minor bracket.” The network of relations that clinicians normally 
find enabling – that is to say, their association with the researchers who provide the 
knowledge base of their profession - are thus unreliable in the case of concussion. 
The disclosure by so many clinicians participating in this study that they have 
been unable to master this area of medical practice indicates how widespread clinical 
uncertainty over concussion is. Concussion also throws into sharper relief the 
dependence of club doctors on the broader network of relations. Clinicians will seek 
to resolve uncertainty through discussions with each other, sport administrators and, 
perhaps most importantly, consultation with the community of sport medicine 
researchers. Clinical uncertainty and epistemological uncertainty therefore come to 
intertwine. An examination of the dynamics of the treatment of concussion, however, 
also requires an understanding of the existential uncertainties that players with 
concussion injuries experience for “clinical and existential reactions to uncertainty 
play to and play off each other in all sorts of ways” (Adamson, 1997, p. 154). It is to 
players’ existential uncertainty that I now turn. 
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Existential Uncertainty and Concussion 
Aspects of existential uncertainty pre-occupy the thoughts of the injured athlete 
(Roderick, 2004). The injured may be stigmatized by their peers and “non-producing” 
athletes labeled as malingerers.  Professional athletes’ dependence on coaches means 
that they live with the constant fear that injury will lead to demotion, enforced 
relocation, or career termination. Roderick (2006b) argues that professional soccer 
players use three coping mechanisms to deal with injury-induced uncertainty: a) 
seeking second opinions; b) negotiating the timing of surgery or other remedial 
action; and c) constructing “treatment timetables” (p. 66).  The first and second rely 
on the identification of compliant clinicians, whilst the third entails a process of 
athlete-clinician negotiation. Each coping mechanism gives the athlete-patient the 
feeling of progress and influence over their future recovery, thus allaying some of the 
uncertainties associated with injury. The existential uncertainty that arises from a 
concussion injury, in contrast, leads players to be relatively independent of, rather 
than more dependent on, clinicians. This, in turn, has ramifications for the actions, 
and ultimately the beliefs, that clinicians hold. 
Existential uncertainty influences the ways that athletes define pain and injury. 
Whilst Young (2004) argues that there has been a lack of rigor in the attempts of 
sociologists of sport to differentiate between these concepts, Malcolm & Sheard 
(2002) and Howe (2004) provide descriptions of how athletes, and rugby players in 
particular, distinguish these phenomena.  Pain is often the “marker of injury” (Howe, 
p. 74) but pain can be experienced in the absence of injury, and one can be injured 
without necessarily being in pain; concussion being a case in point.  Rugby players, 
Malcolm & Sheard (p. 160) argue, see pain as a normal and inherent feature of the 
sport but, crucially, a condition that does not significantly impair functionality or 
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sporting performance. Rugby players define injuries as physical conditions that curb 
their ability to perform to the extent that they are required to miss training and/or 
matches, as this is the point at which existential uncertainty becomes most 
pronounced. 
Concussion injuries are unusual for, in contrast to soft tissue injuries that may 
gradually worsen over time, they occur instantaneously and thus a player’s sense of 
existential uncertainty comes, literally, with a bang. The prescribed cessation of 
playing and training will, furthermore, often be at odds with a player’s understanding 
of their ability to perform and thus “being injured.” Players and coaches do not see 
concussion as necessarily impairing functionality and some specifically noted that, 
despite being concussed, they had remained effective on the pitch.  A coach and 
former player recalled “coming round” in the shower after a game but argued that, “I 
played a great game. I had a fantastic game.”  A current player similarly argued that 
when concussed, “you don’t feel as though there is anything wrong with you.”  
Illustrating the distinction that rugby players draw between pain and injury he went on 
to say, “I mean a week, a day, later (you) might have a sore head, but that’s about it” 
(i.e. in pain but not, according to the player’s definition, injured).  Many seemed 
content to play in the weeks following concussion, a few played after sustaining 
concussions in consecutive matches. Some recognized that concussions posed a 
potential danger to longer-term health, but this risk seemed to be beyond the temporal 
horizons of most players.  Concussed players therefore experience uncertainty 
because their bodies feel unusual, but they seldom experience problems that they 
themselves cannot resolve and rarely, or only briefly, experience uncertainty in the 
form of concern about sporting performance.  
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A concussed player’s existential uncertainty is, moreover, unlikely to be 
relieved through consultation with a clinician. Pharmacological treatment of 
concussion is only recommended in cases of prolonged symptoms (McCrory et al., 
2005) and thus medical staff can offer little by way of remedial action. Clinicians will, 
more typically, merely consult with players to ensure that the condition is not 
worsening.  One player illustrated this when referring to a game in which he had been 
noticeably disoriented: “the doctor came and said, ‘You alright?’ and I said, ‘I just 
feel a bit sore at the back of my head.’  And he said ‘Take it easy.’”  Players cannot 
seek a second opinion because medical knowledge is not sufficiently developed for 
any person to retrospectively deny that a concussion injury occurred, and the 
neurological expertise required to clear someone to resume playing is too specialized 
to be widely accessible. 
A concussed player’s existential uncertainty is, however, likely to increase as a 
consequence of a medical consultation because clinicians are required to impose a 
three-week abstention from the game when they diagnose concussion. This might not 
entail trajectory uncertainty (quite the opposite, the recovery path is rarely so certain), 
but will produce uncertainties over team selection and, ultimately, what the injury 
“means” for a player’s career.  Concussion guidelines make irrelevant the treatment 
timetables that players normally invoke to deal with the uncertainty of being injured. 
A medical consultation for concussion will, therefore, contrast sharply with the “ideal 
medical encounter … in which the physician is certain of the correctness of his or her 
diagnosis, and the patient obtains a clinical response which alleviates his or her 
feelings of existential uncertainty” (Adamson, 1997, p. 136). 
Players are consequently reluctant to seek medical advice for head injuries that 
they can hide.  A former player recalled that, “there have been times where both 
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players and management have said, ‘avoid the possibility of seeing a doctor and being 
diagnosed.’ It’s just a matter of keeping away.” A doctor noted that players often 
talked about “bell ringers,” or “amusing” incidents of concussion on the team bus. 
The doctor inferred from this that players rarely reported concussions to medical staff.  
A physiotherapist similarly noted: 
One of my biggest problems at the club is that you lose head injuries.  If 
someone has a head injury one weekend, you give them advice … (but they) 
don’t come in to see you … they just walk on to the training ground and they 
feel a bit better, so they just go and train. 
Athlete reluctance to consult with medical staff is not unusual in sport, but 
concussion injuries in rugby union lead to rather peculiar forms of existential 
uncertainty and thus to a specific manifestation of this phenomenon.  Players who 
receive concussions may find it difficult to justify an abstention from training to their 
self, and may consequently question, disregard or simply avoid being given medical 
advice. Medical staff can offer little in the way of treatment that can allay existential 
uncertainty and the regulatory framework leads medical staff, and their formal 
diagnosis of concussion, to significantly increase players’ existential uncertainty. The 
uncertainty that concussed rugby players experience ultimately reduces their 
dependence on medical staff and thus clinicians find them particularly difficult to 
manage. Clinicians’ actions are shaped in response to these patient-management 
problems. Clinicians implement diagnostic and treatment guidelines in ways that 
serve to counteract, or limit, the effects of this non-compliance.  
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The Clinical Operationalization of Concussion 
Doctors argued that concussions, and head injuries more generally, were a 
significant source of tension between themselves and players and coaches. One doctor 
argued that head injuries were “one of the things that I absolutely hate about the 
medical side of rugby at the moment.” A second more specifically noted that,  
Quite often the player, within an hour, is back to normal, and with no 
neurological signs or symptoms, and the coach is wanting him to play next 
week. And it’s head injuries, particularly, (that) can be a cause of conflict. 
A third doctor recalled how a player who was withdrawn from a game exhibiting 
concussion symptoms refused to speak to them “for years,” whilst a fourth stated that 
the only major clash that they had experienced stemmed from a player who was 
“obviously concussed.”  The doctor recalled that, “I told the coach that he had to 
come off and he initially said, ‘I’ll make that decision.’”  Concussion may lead to 
some of the most pronounced conflicts over medical management because the 
clinician-patient relationship is likely to create more rather than less existential 
uncertainty for the player, and because the regulatory framework leads the diagnosis 
of concussion to have specific difficulties for coaches over selection.  In both cases 
the involvement of a clinician is seen to hinder rather than help.  
Clinicians’ attempts to allay their own clinical uncertainty through a deeper 
investigation of concussion are, as highlighted above, largely unproductive because 
research only serves to throw into sharper relief epistemological uncertainty over the 
condition. This, combined with the resistance of players and coaches, leads to a 
rejection of treatment protocols. Clinicians come to diagnose concussion in a way that 
they come to know will be acceptable to others in this clinical setting. Because such a 
“compromise” is potentially threatening to their authoritative status, doctors in 
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particular invoke strategies that serve to obscure their clinical uncertainty and thus re-
assert their expertise. 
 
Diagnosing Concussion in the Clinical Context 
Clinicians are enabled in adopting their own diagnostic paradigm (Light, 1979) 
as a consequence of the questioning of the medical evidence for IRB concussion 
guidelines in the sport medicine community. A physiotherapist stated that “the rule of 
thumb that says that you have to be out for three weeks is a bone of contention.” A 
doctor similarly noted that, “evidence for the three week ban is scanty to say the 
least.”  Others pointed to the existence of regulatory differences between sports as 
evidence of the arbitrary nature of IRB policy. One doctor argued, “it’s all a bit 
Mickey Mouse it seems to me. One sport saying, ‘Oh yes, three weeks is alright’ as if 
it’s based on some sort of great scientific foundation when it patently isn’t.” One 
might expect the rejection of a standard treatment philosophy to lead to considerable 
diagnostic variation, but the influence of subcultural norms leads to a distinct pattern 
in the way rugby clinicians diagnose concussion.   
At the most “cautious” end of the spectrum concussion comes to be defined by 
the symptom that the medical literature has traditionally depicted as the most severe; 
that is to say, loss of consciousness.  Doctors typically argued that, “if they haven’t 
been knocked unconscious, they have not suffered concussion.”  Some argued that 
there were “grey areas … where they’ve taken a bit of a knock but they haven’t lost 
consciousness”. The diagnostic examples doctors gave, however, indicated that when 
called upon to make a clinical judgment, symptoms within the so-called “grey areas” 
did not lead to a diagnosis of concussion.  A doctor spoke about a player who “was a 
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bit woozy and a bit woolly headed for ten minutes but made a full recovery” and 
therefore wasn’t diagnosed with concussion.  Another gave the example of,  
a heavy bang, a heavy collision … (It may) sort of daze someone, and they may 
recover after three or four minutes, or their game may be effected for the next 
40 or 50 minutes; they’re not truly concussed, they’re just sort of bashed. 
Some even argued that a loss of consciousness was not, on its own, sufficient to 
diagnose concussion.  In the view of one doctor, “if someone is knocked out and there 
were signs of neurological disturbance, then I would probably seriously think about 
diagnosing concussion” (emphasis added). Clinicians’ rejection of the IRB guidelines 
and their underlying precautionary philosophy is enabled by their knowledge of the 
epistemological uncertainty about concussion. 
Players’ definitions of concussion are shaped by their experiences of existential 
uncertainty and thus also focus on loss of consciousness. One player noted that, 
“(I’ve) never had concussion.  I’ve banged my head a few times, but I’ve never 
knocked myself out.” Another contrasted an instance that he defined as concussion – 
“Out. Out completely” – with one that, despite the presence of symptoms such as 
confusion, blurred vision and disorientation, he did not consider concussion. The low 
number of interviewees who had been “officially” diagnosed as concussed illustrated 
that loss of consciousness was seen as a necessary rather than a sufficient diagnostic 
criterion. Though many argued that losing consciousness was something that most 
rugby players would have experienced a couple of times, just four of the sixteen 
players interviewed stated that they had undergone the proscribed three week 
cessation of playing and training.  Three of these players had experienced a loss of 
consciousness, whilst the fourth player had a suspected fractured skull. In each case, 
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therefore, an impairment to performance was evident and an increased dependence 
upon clinicians was unavoidable. 
The perceptions that players, coaches and medical staff have of concussion 
therefore converge.  Doctors made reference to the influence of subcultural norms in 
this regard.  One doctor, though personally espousing a definition of concussion that 
encompassed other symptoms, noted that, “most people would define concussion, 
most rugby people, if a player was knocked out, even for a few seconds” (emphasis 
added).  The doctor added “rugby players will say ‘That’s not concussed. He wasn’t 
knocked out.’” Clinicians also explicitly recognized that their diagnosis was at times 
more influenced by the broader networks of relations than by their clinical 
understanding of the condition.  One doctor, for instance, described an incident in 
which a player received a “significant” blow to the head. The following quotation 
illustrates how the doctor considered the potential consequences of a diagnosis in 
terms of the coach’s team selection and the player’s subsequent reaction to any 
existential uncertainty this might entail:  
He lost his 1st team place, the 2nd team hooker took his place, played well and 
kept his place.  And really he didn’t get his place back for the rest of the season.  
And that caused him to say to the head coach, “I don't want to stay in (club) I’m 
not getting 1st team rugby.”  He’s now left the club … so you know a single 
injury can have a profound effect on a player’s career.  So you’ve got that to 
bear in mind, but as a Doctor you want to do what’s right medically for the 
patient.   
Since rugby club doctors practice in similar social contexts, or rather are 
enmeshed in similar networks of social relations or figurations, their diagnoses 
converge.  Despite being at odds with IRB regulations and the sport medicine 
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literature, the diagnosis of concussion comes to focus upon loss of consciousness. 
There are two main reasons for this.  First, loss of consciousness is the most visible 
symptom of concussion. It is therefore the symptom about which the least uncertainty 
exists and the symptom that is most likely to increase a player’s dependence upon 
clinicians. Second, loss of consciousness is the symptom traditionally seen as the most 
severe. The diagnosis of concussion entails a heightened state of existential 
uncertainty for a player and thus loss of consciousness is often the minimum symptom 
that rugby players are prepared to accept as indicative of a medical problem. Club 
doctors’ uniformity of approach illustrates that the greater the degree of clinical 
uncertainty the greater the scope for broader social pressures to exert an influence 
over a clinical diagnosis. Clinicians ultimately adopt the definition of concussion most 
widely held by players and coaches because it enables medical consultations to 
continue. Clinicians prefer “to be existentially secure in a supporting social group 
rather than being empirically correct in isolation” (Yair, 2007, p. 687). 
 
Managing Concussion, Asserting Expertise and Professional Success 
Clinicians minimize interpersonal conflicts that might undermine their 
professional status by allowing the pressures stemming from the broader network of 
social relations to direct their diagnosis.  The respect that clinicians might otherwise 
expect is, however, likely to be undermined if others do not perceive them to possess 
skills and techniques that are the preserve of their profession (Malcolm, 2006a). If 
clinicians are not respected, their patients are unlikely to feel dependent upon their 
expertise. Clinicians thus use three interconnected strategies to obscure their clinical 
uncertainty, (re-)establish expertise, and thus contribute to professional success by 
ensuring their clients’ continued reliance upon them. These are: avoidance of 
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diagnosis; the adoption of a personal treatment philosophy; and the individualization 
of cases. 
One way that doctors can mask their clinical uncertainty is to avoid making a 
diagnosis.  A central aspect of this strategy is to adopt the very narrow definition of 
concussion outlined above. In addition to using limited criteria, clinicians become 
reluctant to use the specific labeling.  One doctor, for instance, argued that, “It’s best 
not to diagnose it. It’s best to have an opinion as to whether the player should be 
playing or not.”  The physiotherapist at the same club similarly argued that, “you take 
them off if you suspect it (concussion), but we don’t use the c-word unless we have 
to.”  A second doctor referred to “public concussions and keep-quiet concussions” 
whilst another spoke about a famous televised incident in which a player was “clearly 
concussed” but received no treatment: “The doctor’s excuse was that he wasn’t 
allowed on the pitch to make the diagnosis. He was hiding without (a) doubt.”  Others 
provided personal accounts where a mixture of clinical uncertainty and competitive 
pressure combined to produce a non-diagnosis. Describing the diagnosis of 
concussion as “all a bit arbitrary,” a doctor was asked if a diagnosis depended on 
when the next important game was to be played: 
Exactly! We had a guy, before the play-offs, and he had a bang on the head and 
was dizzy, and he was feeling a bit sick, but he didn’t have amnesia and he 
didn’t have any neurological symptoms and I looked at it and said, “Alright, I 
don’t have to diagnose this as concussion” … and we let him play two weeks 
later. 
Players confirmed the tendency of clinicians to avoid diagnosis. One player 
indicated that, when a concussion occurred at his club, the “player goes off but then 
it’s very quickly pointed out, ‘no he’s not got concussion,’ because as soon as you say 
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he’s got concussion then he’s got to have three weeks off.” The player suggested that 
other considerations influenced the decision: “(this happens) particularly if they’re a 
key player, but if he’s not a key player then he might play the next week and then he 
might wear a scrum cap.”  
Clinicians were, however, required to provide a rationale for their actions when 
circumstances forced a diagnosis. In the absence of a literature that can alleviate 
clinical uncertainty, many of the doctors interviewed used personal experience to 
develop their own “guidelines” for diagnosing concussion.  One identified a reliance 
on experiential knowledge: “I know the players well, I talk to them quietly, I’m 
watching their balance.” A second explicitly contrasted their actions with official 
guidelines: “There is obviously the clinical diagnosis but concussion, as far as I’m 
concerned, is the inability to think straight after a heavy collision; the brain is shutting 
down.” A third supplanted medical guidelines with an assessment of player welfare:  
I want to make sure the player is safe enough to play rugby … Is this guy able 
to take another hit? … Is this guy safe to carry on playing rugby? And that’s 
what I’m interested in, not a label. 
Such rationales enable some diagnostic consistency.  They also have the advantage 
that issues of clinical uncertainty are superseded by seemingly objective 
measurements of functionality.  Allowing sporting performance criteria to override 
medical guidelines further enables the diagnosis to become consistent with rugby 
players’ (and coaches’) own definitions of what constitutes an injury. 
An extension of developing personal treatment philosophies is the process of 
individualizing concussions. Doctors compared concussions to muscle tears, arguing 
that they “are not (all) the same; you can get a mild one and a more severe one.”  
Some further argued that one had to take a player’s recent history of concussion into 
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account when making a decision. Clinicians also considered the way that players had 
responded to previous concussions as part of the process of the individualization of 
injury. One doctor argued that, “Each player responds differently. There are some 
who get knocked every week and are fine after a couple of minutes,” whilst the 
physiotherapist at the club described how individual case management had become 
semi-formalized: 
We (the coaches and medical team) tend to have in our own minds … a rough 
idea of the players who can take a knock on the head, be dazed, clearly 
concussed and recover quite quickly and can then go on and play and don’t 
seem to suffer any long-term effects.  We also have a number of other players 
who tend to suffer far more profoundly from blows to the head and they’re the 
ones we tend to monitor far more carefully. 
These responses to, and understandings of, concussion are far removed from the 
sport’s regulations. The protectionist philosophy underpinning IRB guidelines has the 
unintended consequence of leading clinicians to avoid the diagnosis of concussion. 
The rationalization of personal treatment philosophies and individual case 
management provide the appearance of considered medical assessment and objectivity 
and thus hide the socially constructed character of clinicians’ understandings of 
concussion. The strategy of individualizing cases and allowing sporting performance 
criteria to dictate “fitness to play” decisions, effectively minimizes the potential for 
interpersonal conflict and thus preserves the clinicians’ professional status by 
facilitating the continuation of a collaborative relationship with the patient-player. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
In this article I have drawn upon the understanding of uncertainty within the 
sociology of medicine and applied it to the medical understanding, clinical treatment 
and patient experience of concussion in rugby union. I argue that not only clinicians’ 
behavior, but also their understanding of medical conditions, is shaped by the 
interdependent relationships in which they are enmeshed. Clinicians cannot access 
support from their broader professional network in the form of reliable medical 
knowledge and, because conflict with playing and coaching staff might undermine 
their position, come to internalize a definition of concussion that is similar to the way 
players and coaches understand the condition. This is not simply a conscious 
avoidance of a problematic medical issue, for the process entails an element of 
internal self-adaptation and the adoption of beliefs generated in a way that is starkly at 
odds with the conventions and formal basis of medical practice. In order to ensure that 
this “concession” does not threaten their professional status, clinicians invoke a 
number of strategies that serve to mask their clinical uncertainty and provide the 
appearance of considered medical assessment. Clinicians therefore avoid being 
marginalized and remain part of the network of interdependent relationships that 
constitute the sport club. 
This research develops concepts such as the “normalization” and 
“rationalization” of pain and injury in sport by more explicitly connecting them with 
existential uncertainty. Injured athletes may rationalize their continued participation in 
sport or normalize physical ailments not simply because the sport ethic or culture of 
risk “demands” that they do so, but because these actions partly allay feelings of 
existential uncertainty. This paper also builds on Roderick’s (2004, 2006b) discussion 
of existential uncertainty by identifying that emotional state as contingent not only 
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upon the relationships athletes form with coaches, but also with clinicians. Existential 
uncertainty is contoured by the interdependent relationships in which any individual is 
enmeshed. 
This analysis, moreover, enhances our understanding of the clinician-athlete 
negotiation process described in much of the literature on clinical practice in sport 
medicine.  The literature has largely portrayed clinicians as confident in their own 
knowledge yet frustrated by their inability to gain compliance from their athlete-
patients. This study of concussion, in contrast, highlights the insecurities clinicians 
experience and thus the sometimes weak evidential basis of their negotiating position. 
Clinicians’ willingness and ability to adopt beliefs about a medical condition that are 
partly at odds with the sport medicine literature and wholly against the spirit of IRB 
regulations, shows how fundamentally effected they are by  their involvement in these 
networks of relations. Where athletes tolerate injuries in order to maintain their 
athletic self (Pike & Maguire, 2003), clinicians tolerate “compromised” diagnoses to 
maintain their medical self. 
The use of the concept of uncertainty, and the figurational sociological 
emphasis on interdependence, may also therefore broaden understanding of the 
treatment of injuries in sport.  Concussion is clearly rather different to the soft tissue 
injuries that athletes most commonly experience. Its potential severity is offset by its 
short-lived nature and (often) spontaneous resolution and concussion policies in rugby 
union, but also across sport, are relatively proscriptive.  Players and clinicians may 
therefore experience different degrees of uncertainty to that experienced in relation to 
other types of injury. It is not the case however that this uncertainty is different in 
kind. As Kevin Young (1993) has argued, “sports workplaces are simultaneously sites 
of medical mastery and extraordinary medical neglect” (p. 376). Uncertainty is likely 
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to be a regular, and heightened, experience for clinicians at this cutting edge of 
medicine, where innovation and experimentation are driven by the search for 
performance-enhancement (Theberge, 2006). Clinicians can never be sure whether, 
for instance, playing with a damaged muscle will lead to further harm, and 
negotiations over treatment will centrally involve the interplay of this clinical 
uncertainty and the athlete’s existential uncertainty. Clinicians’ management of 
uncertainty will profoundly influence the degree to which athletes perceive medical 
consultations to be beneficial. This, in turn, will influence the degree to which 
clinicians can persuade athletes to comply with their advice.  
The illustration in this study that clinicians may sometimes prioritize self-
respect within the rugby club over medical considerations highlights the importance 
of interdependence to the understanding of human relations. Where clinicians are less 
isolated and work more closely with other medically qualified personnel (Malcolm, 
2006b), they may experience interdependencies that counteract the strong dependence 
upon the evaluation of their “clients” evident here (Malcolm, 2006a). Clinicians’ 
actions will be less influenced by broader social pressures when they have confidence 
that the research-orientated members of their profession have produced relatively 
reliable knowledge that supports their actions. Elias’s conception of interdependence 
is of value, thus, because it enables the analysis to move beyond the face-to-face 
clinician-athlete interactions, and to encompass the broader constituencies from which 
people draw occupational status and emotional support, and thus draw aspects of their 
identity.   
I do not claim that this paper expands Elias’s theoretical model. The focus on 
clinician-athlete relations, and in particular the exercise and contestation of 
knowledge within these relations, is compatible with Elias’s emphasis on the 
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polymorphous nature of power, and the specificity of power relations to different 
contexts. Figurational sociologists of sport have not previously used the concept of 
uncertainty to illustrate the limited human understanding of the social world that 
necessarily stems from the complexity of figurations, but again I see this as an 
expansion rather than a revision of Elias’s existing theoretical framework. By 
applying these ideas to a rather different subject matter, and in a way that figurational 
sociologists of sport have perhaps not previously done, this paper may illustrate a 
greater breadth to the approach than has previously been apparent. 
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Notes 
 
1  Doctors may also keep patients in a state of “optimistic uncertainty” as a way 
of facilitating patient compliance. 
2  Clubs in the top two Leagues largely have full-time coaching and playing 
staffs.  Below this clubs may have one or two full-time players (often player-
coaches or youth development officers), supported by paid, but part-time 
players. 
3  Clause 10.1.3 states that the minimum period of absence is mandatory for age 
group rugby. 
